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This paper explores school reform in England under the Conservative-led Coalition government, 
elected in 2010, through a focus on the changing roles and status of Local Authorities (LAs). The 
Coalition’s stated aim was the development of a ‘self-improving, school-led’ system in which 
LAs should become ‘champions for children’. The paper draws on two locality case studies and 
a set of future scenarios and policy narratives to analyse the ways in which LAs and school 
leaders are responding to reform. The paper concludes that the Coalition focused its attention 
on structural reform, but that this placed an additional onus on leadership agency within local 
school systems to shape contextually appropriate solutions. The schools in the two areas 
studied appear to have become more fragmented and yet – paradoxically – more networked; 
however, they are not yet working in the ‘deep partnerships’ envisaged by Hargreaves (2010). 
This has meant that the LAs have needed to sustain their traditional roles (for example, in 
providing challenge and support to schools), whilst simultaneously evolving new ways of 
working (for example, providing ‘bridging social capital’). These roles may sometimes be in 
tension, but are driven by different factors: LA-level accountability in the case of challenge 
and support, and reduced funding in the case of ‘bridging social capital’. This suggests that 
the Coalition’s conflicting policy narratives were in tension and that the notion of LAs as 
‘champions for children’ requires review. 
Keywords: self-improving system; school-led system; school improvement; school-to-school 
support; school partnerships; school networks; school leadership; system leadership; Local 
Authorities; middle tier; mediating layer 
Background 
This paper explores the implications of the structural reforms in English education introduced 
by the Conservative-led Coalition Government elected in 2010. The election of a Conservative-
majority government in May 2015 means that this broad policy direction can be expected to 
continue. This paper draws on two local area reviews that the author led or participated in 
during 2013–14 to analyse the ways in which Local Authorities (LAs) and school leaders are 
responding to policy reform. The findings from the reviews are analysed using two theoretical 
constructs: the first is a set of scenarios developed by the author in consultation with a group 
of school and LA leaders in 2012; the second is a set of four policy narratives identified by the 
author through discourse analysis of Coalition speeches and publications. 
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The two reviews drawn on for this paper were commissioned by the respective LAs – the 
London Borough of Brent (Gilbert et al., 2014), and Coventry in the West Midlands (Greany 
and Allan, 2014). In Brent the evaluation team gathered evidence on the LA’s current approach 
to school improvement and support through several means: a call for evidence; analysis of LA 
and national reports and data; an independent review of school performance data; discussions 
with a range of stakeholders, including the trade unions and the Leader and Lead Member for 
Education in the Council; and visits and interviews with 20 schools. The schools were selected 
to represent both key ‘system leaders’ (such as Teaching Schools, National Leaders of Education 
(NLEs), and academy sponsors – see below for definitions) and a more representative spread of 
schools with different performance profiles from primary, secondary, and special phases. In each 
school the headteacher and, in most cases, other senior staff and governors were interviewed 
using a semi-structured interview protocol. In Coventry the review included analysis of publicly 
available and LA documentary evidence and performance data, interviews with LA leaders (the 
CEO, Lead Member for Education, and Shadow Lead Member for Education), interviews with 
external stakeholders (Ofsted and the National College for Teaching and Leadership), an online 
survey of all Coventry headteachers (24 responses received), and interviews with 28 school 
leaders (headteachers and school governors). The schools were selected to include both key 
‘system leaders’ (e.g. the headteachers leading Coventry’s 12 school networks, Teaching Schools, 
and NLEs) and a more representative spread of schools with different performance profiles that 
were drawn from five school networks that were studied in more depth. 
The selection of the two LAs is a result of the author being commissioned, via a competitive 
tender in Coventry and an invitation from the review chair in Brent. The two reviews thus 
provide illustrative case studies (Thomas, 2011) that can provide ‘naturalistic generalizability’ 
(Stake, 2000). The evidence from the literature reviewed below and from separate, independently 
funded research across a larger sample of LAs that is currently being undertaken by the author 
indicates that similar developments are in train nationwide. The literature referenced in this 
paper was identified by searching Google Scholar and the IOE library ejournal resource using 
the keywords of the present article. 
As can be seen from Table 1, Brent and Coventry have some broad similarities, in terms 
of their size, urban context, and above-average levels of deprivation. The majority of secondary 
schools in both LAs had adopted academy status by April 2014. Both LAs were behind the 
national picture in terms of primary academy conversion rates: for example, by November 2014 
36 LAs nationally had 20 per cent or more of their primary schools working as academies (Bolton, 
2014). Both LAs ranked highly for the proportion of schools that hold formal system leadership 
designations (i.e. as a Teaching School or headed by a National or Local Leader of Education), 
although this is true for many urban areas. In terms of pupil outcomes, Brent performs above the 
national average while Coventry performs below it. Additional features of the two LAs and their 
schools are described in Box 1. 
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Table 1: Brent and Coventry Local Authorities: Key features
 Brent Coventry
Authority type Unitary Metropolitan Borough Council
Political control 2010–14 Labour Labour
Number of schools 67 state-funded infant/junior/
primary
17 state-funded secondary 
88 state-funded infant/junior/
primary
24 state-funded secondary
Percentage of LA primary 
schools that were 
academies in April 2014 
(% sponsored academies)
3% (2% sponsored) 6% (6% sponsored)
Percentage of LA 
secondary schools that 
were academies in April 
2014
73% (27% sponsored) 63% (16% sponsored)
LA rank for percentage 
of schools with National 
Leader of Education, 
Teaching School or Local 
Leader of Education 
designations in April 2014 
8th out of 154 LAs 16th out of 154 LAs
Percentage of children in 
poverty in 2010 (National 
rate = 21.3%)1
35% child poverty 27% child poverty
% compulsory-age pupils 
eligible for free school 
meals (FSM) at any time 
in previous 6 years, Jan 
2014 (National = 26.9%)
34% 33% 
Key stage 2 performance 
2014 (% achieving level 
4 or above in reading, 
writing, and maths. 
National = 78%)
80% L4+ 76% L4+
Key Stage 4 performance 
2014 (% achieving 5+ A*–C 
GCSEs (or equivalent) 
including English and 
maths (“5 A*–C EM”). 
National = 56.6%)
60% 5 A*–C EM 52.3% 5 A*–C EM
Percentage performance 
gap between FSM and 
non-FSM pupils at 
KS4 over three years 
(National = -27.2%)
-19.4% -26%
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Box 1: Brent and Coventry: Outline descriptions of the LAs and their 
schools
Brent and the London Challenge 
Brent is an outer London borough formed in 1965. It has been controlled by Labour for 
around half its history. It is the most densely populated of the outer London boroughs and 
continues to increase in density – its population grew by 18 per cent between 2001 and 
2011. The ethnic make-up of the population changed over the same period, with a 9 per cent 
reduction in the White ethnic group and a corresponding increase in the Black and Asian 
Minority Ethnic (BAME) population from 55 per cent to 64 per cent. Brent’s pupil population 
continues to increase: for example, the number of primary age children grew by 13.7 per 
cent between January 2010 and October 2013.
Brent’s higher-than-average performance in terms of school and pupil attainment reflects the 
wider picture across London, which saw dramatic improvement from being the lowest to 
the highest performing English region during the 2000s. Debates continue around the causes 
of London’s improvement (Baars et al., 2014; Greaves et al., 2014), with the role of primary 
school performance and immigration both highlighted, although most commentators agree 
that Labour’s London Challenge programme played a significant role (Ofsted, 2010; Rudd et 
al., 2011; Hutchings et al., 2012). 
While the Challenge was a pan-London programme, the role of the individual Local 
Authorities responsible for the city’s 32 boroughs remained important (Woods et al., 2013). 
The London Challenge finished before the Coalition was elected in 2010, yet London’s 
schools have largely continued their upward trajectory since then. Meanwhile, Brent’s 
improvement has slowed, taking it from being one of London’s highest performing boroughs 
in 2009 to a middle performer by 2014. 
Coventry 
Coventry is a city in the West Midlands with a strong industrial tradition as a centre of 
the British car industry. It suffered heavy bombing during the Second World War and then 
embraced an ambitious town planning and rebuilding programme (Kynaston, 2008). Coventry 
LA needed to find savings of over £60m in total between 2011–12 and 2015–16. The LA 
was judged ‘Inadequate’ by Ofsted in March 2014 for the quality of its social care services 
for children. 
In terms of educational performance, Ofsted’s 2011–12 annual report included a league table 
of Local Authorities, ranked by the proportion of schools that were ‘Good’ or ‘Outstanding’: 
Coventry came bottom overall, with 42 per cent. The picture differed between phases: 78 
per cent of secondary schools in Coventry were rated ‘Good’ or ‘Outstanding’, but just 41 
per cent of primary schools were. Concerted action by the LA and schools since then has 
improved this picture, but the LA still performs below its equivalent peers and national rates. 
The Coalition’s reform programme: The ‘self-improving school-led system’
A number of researchers on school system reform refer to ‘tri-level reform’ (Fullan, 2010; 
Levin, 2012) as a common approach. Tri-level reformers attempt to focus and align activity and 
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resources between central government, district (i.e. LA) and school levels, around a shared set 
of goals with a significant focus on capacity building. By definition, the ‘tri-level’ model assumes a 
strong role for what is variously called the ‘district level’, ‘middle tier’ or ‘mediating layer’, which 
is largely synonymous with local government in most school systems. Mourshed et al. (2010) 
found that every international system they studied had some type of intermediate layer between 
central government and schools, playing three important roles: 
As the school systems we studied have progressed on their improvement journey, they seem to 
have increasingly come to rely on a ‘mediating layer’ that acts between the centre and the schools. 
This mediating layer sustains improvement by providing three things of importance to the system: 
targeted hands-on support to schools, a buffer between the school and the centre, and a channel 
to share and integrate improvements across schools.
(Mourshed et al., 2010: 22)
The Coalition government in England resisted both tri-level reform as a model and a strong 
mediating layer as a design feature. Instead, the Coalition’s broad approach was to maximize 
school autonomy while raising the accountability bar for schools, increasing diversity and choice 
for parents and reducing the role of central and local government where possible. This reform 
programme has been radical and widespread, affecting almost every aspect of school life (see 
Lupton and Thomson, 2015). It has come to be known as ‘the school-improving, school-led 
system’ (see Greany, 2014, 2015a, 2015b; Greany and Scott, 2014; and Greany and Brown, 2015 
for more detailed analyses of this policy). 
The academies programme has been a key element of this reform, with particular implications 
for LAs, since academies are companies and charities that are funded directly by central 
government and are outside LA control. By December 2014 there were 4,344 academies open; 
these included over half of all secondary schools in England (HoC Education Select Committee, 
2015), although around four in five schools were still maintained by their LA. Successful schools 
were encouraged to convert voluntarily to academy status, while schools judged to be failing 
by Ofsted (which inspects schools, LAs, and wider children’s services) were forced to become 
‘sponsored academies’, meaning that they were removed from LA control and run as part of 
Multi-Academy Trusts (MATs, or academy chains). Free Schools are new academies that can be 
proposed and developed by parent groups and other providers who want to challenge existing 
local provision. There were just over 150 free schools open in 2014. 
A further innovation has been the expansion of system leadership and school-to-school 
support, whereby high-performing leaders support under-performing schools and promote 
wider system improvement (Higham et al., 2009; Hill and Matthews, 2008, 2010; Ofsted, 2010). 
For example, the Coalition doubled the number of NLEs to 1,000 and introduced 500 Teaching 
Schools. NLEs are headteachers who are designated to work with their school leadership 
team to provide support to schools that are struggling. Teaching Schools are designated by the 
government to co-ordinate initial and continuing professional development, school-to-school 
support, and research and development across an alliance of partner schools (Matthews and 
Berwick, 2013). By the end of the Coalition’s time in office it could be argued that school-to-
school support was the primary mechanism for school improvement in England (Sandals and 
Bryant, 2014; Earley and Higham, 2012; Education Select Committee, 2013). 
Few studies are assessing the ways in which attitudes and practices are evolving on the ground 
as a result of Coalition policies. Earley and Higham’s 2012 research suggested that headteachers fall 
into one of four categories: confident, cautious, concerned, or constrained.2 Research with ‘well-
positioned’ headteachers (i.e. those from schools that are Ofsted-rated ‘Good’ or ‘Outstanding’) 
suggests they see the world as increasingly hierarchical, indicating the risk of a two-tier system in 
which the weak get weaker and the strong stronger (Coldron et al., 2014). 
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The changing role of Local Authorities in a self-improving school-led 
system
When universal primary and secondary education was developed after the Second World War, 
Local Education Authorities were given the prime responsibility for shaping and overseeing 
provision in their area – a ‘national system, locally administered’. The power and authority of 
LAs was then steadily eroded from the 1970s onwards as school autonomy increased, with 
Grant Maintained and then academy schools accelerating this shift towards central funding and 
oversight from the 1990s onwards (Volansky, 2003; Newsam, 2014). By 2009 school leaders in 
England were ranked among the most autonomous in the world in terms of their decision-
making powers (OECD, 2011). Nevertheless, under the 1997–2010 New Labour Governments, 
LAs largely retained – and in many cases extended – their powers and responsibilities in 
relation to schools, for example through the National Literacy and Numeracy Strategies. The 
effectiveness of LAs in fulfilling these roles varied, which the Labour Government sought to 
address by outsourcing some or all underperforming LA functions to private companies and 
charities. 
The Coalition’s 2010 white paper envisaged LAs playing: 
a critical new role – as strengthened champions of choice, securing a wide range of education 
options for parents and families, ensuring there are sufficient high-quality school places, 
coordinating fair admissions, promoting social justice by supporting vulnerable children and 
challenging schools which fail to improve. 
(DfE, 2010: 65). 
The onus was on LAs themselves to shape this new role – for example by offering school 
improvement as a traded service and/or beyond their immediate boundaries – with the Coalition 
promising to free them from unnecessary bureaucracy to enable this entrepreneurial diversity 
to emerge. In practice, LA spending on education reduced by around 18 per cent between 2009 
and 2013, largely as a result of schools becoming academies and a sharp reduction in ring-fenced 
grants administered by LAs (Hastings et al., 2013). As a result, most LAs have had to reduce their 
staffing and capacity, while the focus of most Coalition policy activity and effort has been on 
expanding the number and performance of academies, and on designing a national infrastructure 
to fund and oversee so many academies directly from Westminster (Greany and Scott, 2014). 
A number of commentators have explored questions such as how local democratic 
accountability might best be secured and how support and challenge for all schools might be 
orchestrated in a fully academized system. Arguments range from increasing accountability 
through the market (O’Shaugnessy, 2012), to a re-conceptualized role for LAs (Gilbert et al., 
2013), to the need for a new middle tier to manage school provision, challenge, and support 
(Hill, 2012; Blunkett, 2014). By 2014 the Coalition had accepted the need for increased regional 
capacity to oversee academies, and appointed eight Regional Schools Commissioners (RSCs), 
supported and advised by elected Head Teacher Boards. The RSCs report to the Secretary of 
State and are charged with monitoring the performance of academies and free schools in their 
area and intervening where standards drop. Thus the mediating layer in England today is made up 
of multiple players. Ball describes this move away from oversight of all schools by democratically 
elected LAs and towards a more complex, heterarchical model of governance as characteristic 
of a ‘reluctant state’ that is deliberately reducing its role in publicly funded schooling (Ball, 2012). 
Interestingly, when it comes to impact, the most recent analysis of MAT and LA performance 
(DfE, 2015; Cook, 2015) shows an overlapping range of performance for both models.
The focus on building an academized system has meant that LAs have largely been subject 
to policy neglect by the Coalition (see Rogers, n.d., for a summary of key policy developments 
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in relation to LA oversight of schools). For example, LAs have retained nearly two hundred 
statutory duties3 in relation to education, including a requirement to appoint a Director of 
Children’s Services (despite the fact that few can now afford or justify such a role). A subset 
of LAs appeared after 2010 to take an initial view that they should encourage all schools to 
become academies as quickly as possible, thereby freeing up LA resources and minimizing risk 
since the schools would be accountable to the Secretary of State rather than the LA. Others – 
particularly Labour-controlled LAs in the north – sought to prevent any schools converting to 
academy status and to retain their existing school improvement teams as far as possible. A third 
group – such as Wigan (Aston et al., 2013) – reduced their core teams and asked all schools to 
join a school-led network with a designated lead school responsible for school improvement. 
By 2012 Ofsted appears to have become concerned that the lack of focus on LAs coupled with 
their reducing capacity was leading to a loss of momentum in terms of school improvement. 
In response Ofsted began inspecting LA school improvement services from 2013, publishing 
damning critiques and requiring detailed action plans where performance was found to be weak.4
In practical terms the task for LA leaders responsible for oversight of schools since 2010 
can therefore be seen as threefold: 
• to continue to fulfil their statutory obligations with regard to maintained schools in the 
context of sharply reduced funding; 
• to continue to fulfil their wider statutory obligations relating to education, for example 
to ensure a sufficient supply of school places; and
• to shape a meaningful new role as a ‘champion for children’ as more schools become 
academies. 
As yet, there has been relatively little research to understand the ways in which LAs are 
responding to these challenges. Ainscow (2015) provides an insider’s perspective on the often 
painful and variable process of change for 10 LAs involved in the Greater Manchester Challenge, 
a Labour initiative that continued into the early years of the Coalition and that informed the 
focus on ‘school-led’ reform. Aston et al. (2013) drew on case studies of innovative LAs and other 
local arrangements to identify some of the ways in which local school systems were beginning 
to work. Simkins (2015) analysed the responses of three contrasting LAs and their schools with 
a focus on the types of school partnerships emerging in each locality. Sandals and Bryant (2014) 
tracked progress across ten LA areas over one year, with a focus on three areas of practice that 
were identified from an earlier phase of DfE-sponsored action research (Parish et al., 2012). 
Whereas the 2012 report signalled concerns about a lack of capacity for self-improvement 
and a lack of buy-in from autonomous schools to areas where collective action and decision 
making is required, the 2014 report painted a more positive picture. It found that confidence 
and commitment to partnership working were growing amongst school leaders and cited many 
specific examples of how this was developing in different contexts. Confidence in the capacity of 
local systems to meet the needs of vulnerable children was less strong. Sandals and Bryant also 
hinted that some LAs were struggling to engage schools in a collaborative dialogue through its 
characterization of them as either ‘timely adapters’ (i.e. strong LAs that have worked with schools 
to shape more school-led approaches); ‘slow movers’ (lower-performing and less credible LAs 
that have not managed to respond to the changing environment); or ‘sudden reactors’ (LAs that 
have withdrawn from provision with little attention to capacity-building in schools). 
Hatcher (2014) offers a critical perspective on the examples presented by Aston et al. (2013) 
and also draws on his own research into the development of a headteacher-led partnership in 
Birmingham. He identifies the trend towards developing new partnership arrangements that 
attempt to secure collaborative engagement and strategic oversight, but argues that these are 
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‘closed managerialist networks’ that exclude or minimize the legitimate democratic role of LAs 
as well as other stakeholders such as parents. He views them as focused on delivering narrow, 
government-prescribed school improvement priorities rather than a more developmental or 
critical agenda. 
Analysis and discussion 
The approaches to school improvement and reform adopted by Brent and Coventry are briefly 
outlined in Box 2. At the simplest level, Brent’s approach could be described as ‘pared back 
monitoring and intervention’, while Coventry’s was ‘intensive monitoring, brokerage of school-
to-school support, and capacity building through school networks’. Both LAs continued to offer 
some services to schools, generally on a traded ‘buy-back’ basis (meaning the schools could 
choose whether or not to purchase the services). Both LAs had mixed – often poor – relationships 
with their academies, though the Lead Member in Coventry was continuing to provide active 
challenge to its academies. Meanwhile, in both areas and with varying degrees of LA support, 
a number of schools had begun to shape a more ‘school-led’ approach to improvement. The 
Brent Schools Partnership (BSP) was initiated by system leader schools, although it had received 
some funding from the LA, and its membership did not include all LA schools. Coventry’s 12 
school partnerships had been initiated and funded by the LA, so did nominally include all schools. 
The city’s Teaching School Alliances had developed separately, but had recently agreed to align 
themselves with the networks. 
Box 2: Headline findings from Brent and Coventry
Brent’s approach to school improvement and development
Headteachers and other stakeholders in Brent told the Commission that the Council’s 
approach towards many issues was not strategic. The Commission concluded that ‘education 
has not been a sufficiently high priority for the Council for many years’ and identified a 
number of areas, such as pupil place planning, where the quality of education was at risk as a 
result. Many senior positions in the education department had been undertaken by interim 
staff for an extended period. Relations with academies in the borough were often poor. 
Although the LA’s standards of performance remained high by national standards, it was 
slipping compared to other London boroughs and the totals masked significant issues, such 
as the fact that one in five secondary schools in the borough were ranked ‘Inadequate’ by 
Ofsted in 2014 – the highest rate in London. 
The LA had recently moved to a new model that focused attention on monitoring and 
supporting lower-performing maintained schools, drawing on a mixture of LA staff and 
brokered school-to-school support. Ofsted ‘Good’ and ‘Outstanding’ schools in Brent were 
now largely left alone, subject only to a light-touch annual monitoring visit. Many higher-
performing schools in Brent were actively looking beyond the LA for partnerships and 
support from regional and national organizations. Meanwhile, a number of Brent schools 
had come together to form the Brent Schools Partnership (BSP), which saw its aim as ‘not 
to replace the services provided by the LA, but to work together to ensure that all services 
provided to our schools are of high quality and have impact’. The Commission concluded 
that ‘Head teachers want the BSP to work but they are not yet seeing enough of the kind 
of support that they want.’
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Coventry’s approach to school improvement and development
Ofsted undertook an area inspection of Coventry LA’s schools in early 2013, which found 
that ‘there is still some way to go in establishing a widely understood and methodically 
delivered strategy for improvement’. Coventry’s primary schools have improved rapidly 
since then, with 74 per cent judged ‘Good’ or ‘Outstanding’ by summer 2014, although 
the city’s 2014 KS2 national test results remained below national averages and significantly 
below the highest-performing similar authorities. Secondary schools in the city declined in 
Ofsted terms and in terms of overall attainment between 2012 and 2014, after several years 
of steady improvement, leaving them below national averages and in the bottom quintile of 
authorities nationally. 
The Lead Councillor for Education started monitoring the progress of all schools and 
students in the city following the Ofsted review, with a focus on the 30 schools most at risk. 
The LA now commissions experts to help schools that are struggling, wherever possible 
from other schools within the city. Views expressed by interviewees included that the LA 
was good in the past but had ‘lost its way’ a few years back, that it has been very inwardly 
focused as it has grappled with cuts and personnel changes, that it has sometimes provided 
insufficient leadership and challenge, and that it has been overly focused on primaries. More 
positively, most school leaders felt that the LA had improved in the past 18 months, and that 
the new model of differentiated challenge and support for schools was credible. 
The LA had started funding school networks before 2013, as a way to build capacity as LA 
resources decreased. The evaluation found that these networks were now developing well, 
although some – generally those that had been established for longer – were stronger than 
others. The review concluded that ‘at present, it appears that the challenge role is too firmly 
driven by the LA and the support role is not sufficiently led by schools’. 
A framework for analysis: Four scenarios
One framework for assessing the Brent and Coventry cases is a set of scenarios that I developed 
with a group of primary school and LA leaders through a series of four workshops in late 2012. 
The framework for the scenarios is shown in Figure 1 and the four scenarios are sketched 
out in Annex A. The framework includes two variables: competition versus collaboration 
between schools, and whether the LA remains a significant force or disintegrates in the face of 
academization. 
Chermack (2005) offers a theoretical framework for scenario planning, wherein one of the 
roles of scenarios is to enable learning by helping leaders to ‘reperceive the organization and 
its environment’ (Chermack, 2005: 62). He outlines a series of testable hypotheses that can be 
used to assess the impact of scenario planning on organizational performance. Our intention in 
developing the LA scenarios was certainly to enable leaders to ‘reperceive’ their relationships 
and the potential implications of different courses of action at a time of rapid change. However, 
rather than seeing the scenarios as a means of improving performance, our aim was more 
limited: we wanted to map out potential outcomes if different courses of action were taken, and 
we wanted to emphasize that no outcome was given – i.e. that leaders could choose to act in 
different ways to secure different desired outcomes. 
Analysing the Brent and Coventry examples against the four scenarios, it is clear that there 
is no neat fit. This is not surprising; the scenarios were written to caricature extreme possible 
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outcomes, for example by positing that all schools might collaborate all the time, when the 
reality is that schools operate on a spectrum between competition and collaboration. As a 
result, while both Brent and Coventry can be seen to have aspects of scenario A (LA remains; 
schools compete), because both have had to move away from universal services towards a 
traded ‘buy-back’ offer (Glover et al., 2014), neither LA could be said to fit only into this scenario. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to see features of Brent or Coventry more clearly in some scenarios 
than others. For example, Coventry is an authority that has been highly active since the 2013 
Ofsted review and has sought to proactively build school networks, placing it most obviously 
in scenario B (LA remains; schools collaborate). Brent is an authority that, at least prior to the 
Commission report, has lacked a clear vision and role beyond a focus on the lowest-performing 
schools. Many of its secondary schools are fiercely competitive with each other and dismissive 
of the LA, actively looking beyond LA boundaries for inspiration and support. This seems to put 
Brent most obviously in scenario C (LA disappears; schools compete), although the development 
of the BSP is more characteristic of scenario D (LA disappears; schools collaborate), while the 
Commission’s recommendations appear to be an attempt to move the LA into scenario B.
What seems most interesting in reviewing the scenarios is that, back in 2012, the school and 
LA leaders were hypothesizing the disappearance of LAs altogether. At that time, the expansion 
of academies and the policy neglect of LAs made this seem a real possibility. For example, the 
RSA was undertaking a review at that time to understand what a fully academized system might 
look like (Gilbert et al., 2013). Yet, three years later, the two LAs studied appear to be sustaining 
their roles (for example, by continuing to monitor and intervene in underperforming schools), 
whilst also beginning to shape new ways of working (for example, providing ‘bridging social 
capital’ by funding and supporting school networks). 
Figure 1: Framework for assessing school and LA responses to the ‘self-improving system’ 
A second framework for analysing the two case studies is a set of four parallel narratives in 
Coalition policy that I identified through a discourse analysis of policy documents and speeches 
(Greany, 2014):
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• World-class/no excuses: includes policies such as a more demanding National Curriculum 
and assessment framework, and rising floor targets for schools. Schools that do not 
achieve these higher benchmarks are taken over by academy sponsors. 
• Freedom to teach: includes increased autonomy for academies and new powers for all 
schools, for example on performance-related pay and classroom behaviour, as well as 
reduced bureaucracy. 
• Market-based approach: includes increased parent choice and competition for schools 
through Free Schools, as well as a more equitable and national funding formula. 
• System leadership approach: includes mechanisms for school-to-school support, such as 
Teaching Schools and NLEs, as well as school-led solutions such as Headteacher Boards 
and a Royal College of Teaching. 
I have argued elsewhere that these competing narratives create tensions and contradictions 
for school leaders and that they accentuate local hierarchies of schools (Greany, 2014, 2015a; 
Coldron et al., 2014), but here I want to assess their impact on LAs. 
Three themes from the analysis 
Three themes emerge from comparing the scenarios and narratives with the real-world examples 
of Brent and Coventry, which I explore below. 
1. The LAs have sustained but reshaped their monitoring and intervention roles, driven primarily by 
accountability pressures 
Comparing the scenarios with the real-world LA examples reveals that the scenarios underplay 
the continuing importance of monitoring and intervention for maintained schools by LAs, and to 
a lesser extent academies. This is the classic LA school improvement role, as defined over several 
decades in reams of legislation and guidance, but in the Coalition’s rush for a fully academized 
system after 2010 this role was at risk of neglect or disintegration in many LAs. 
The four narratives arguably define the possible drivers for this LA behaviour: 
• accountability through Ofsted reviews – world class/no excuses 
• school empowerment – freedom to teach
• reduced LA core budgets – market-based approach
• the need to draw on the most credible and expert leaders – system leadership. 
The pressure from school empowerment (i.e. that schools might choose to leave the LA and 
become academies if services were not good enough) does not appear to have been a primary 
driver of the reshaped offer in either LA: if it were, then Brent would surely be doing more to 
ensure Ofsted ‘Good’ and ‘Outstanding’ schools were receiving a more comprehensive service, 
since these are the schools that could convert to academy status most easily. The reduced 
resources available to LAs certainly appear to have driven change: both LAs have moved from 
a universal offer to focus their resources on schools causing concern, but this appears to be a 
case of ‘cutting the cloth’ rather than responding to market pressures. Both LAs had increased 
the use of serving/recently retired headteachers to provide monitoring support and both were 
commissioning school-to-school support interventions instead of LA advisors, suggesting that 
the system leadership narrative has had an impact. However, it was Ofsted’s decision to focus 
on the LA school improvement role from 2013 onwards that appears to have had the greatest 
impact on LA decisions and action in this area: for example, the Chief Executive of Coventry 
described the 2013 Ofsted review as a ‘burning platform’ for change. 
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2. The LAs have sought to increase leadership agency, in particular by providing ‘bridging social capital’, 
which strengthens school networks 
Both LAs have sought to enhance ‘bridging social capital’ (Mulford, in Ainscow, 2015) between 
schools, most obviously by establishing and funding the school networks in Coventry and through 
support for the BSP. This strengthening of relational capital between schools appears to be seen 
by the LAs as a necessary foundation for ‘school-led improvement’, thereby enabling the LA to 
‘get off the pitch’ (Coventry LA CEO). The theory of action underpinning such a shift was not 
fully developed in either LA, although the fact that they both commissioned external reviews 
might indicate a recognition of the need for a more strategic approach. 
What seems clear is that the combination of contradictory national policy narratives coupled 
with limited capacity-building for school leaders at LA level meant that schools were responding 
in widely differing ways to the change agenda. This response was also influenced by each school’s 
existing position within the local hierarchy, which depended in part on its Ofsted profile, since 
this determined whether or not it could become an academy or Teaching School for example. 
These leadership responses appeared to fall on three broad spectra: reactive (fatalistic) versus 
proactive; individual versus collective; and focused on shared values versus focused on compliance 
with external requirements. All these responses were apparent in both Brent and Coventry, from 
the system leaders working to shape the BSP and the Coventry networks (proactive, collective, 
shared values), to the headteacher who was fearful of peer review, sceptical that the networks 
would make a difference for his school, and focused on his next Ofsted inspection (reactive, 
individual, compliance-focused). 
The LAs appeared to play a role in influencing the ways in which this school leadership 
agency was enacted, with a subtle balance to be struck between shaping a collective approach 
without dominating and thereby preventing the emergence of school-led solutions. For 
example, there was a consistent commitment to sustaining ‘the Coventry family of schools’ 
from both school and LA leaders there, and the LA had been proactive in funding the school 
networks. This suggests a commitment to the ‘system leadership’ policy narrative, yet the LA 
was also supporting the development of new free schools, albeit in a strategic way (for example, 
working with the secondary schools to develop a shared proposal for a new special school). 
This indicates that the LA was supportive of the other policy narratives, but was working to 
mediate their potential negative impacts (since a new Free School could potentially increase 
competition between schools). The possible downside of Coventry’s proactive approach, in 
particular to the monitoring and intervention of schools, may have been that schools did not 
feel a great need to develop their own solutions: for example, there was no equivalent to the 
BSP in Coventry. By contrast, Brent had been far less proactive in shaping and implementing 
a shared vision among its schools and had adopted a reactive approach to new Free Schools. 
This may explain why the borough felt more fragmented, with many strong schools looking 
elsewhere for inspiration and collaboration, while others were hoping the BSP could provide a 
more collective solution. 
Thus it can be seen that leadership agency is as important for the LAs as for their schools: 
agency here denotes the extent to which the LA has the capacity and credibility to shape collective 
solutions to shared challenges. This LA leadership appeared to range along the same dimensions 
as for schools – reactive/proactive, individual/collective, and values-based/compliance-focused. 
What was notable, however, was that LA leadership agency was critically influenced by whether 
or not the LA was seen as competent and credible: that is, who was involved and how they 
worked were as important as what they did. For example, both LAs had reduced their internal 
adviser teams in favour of buying in serving heads or HMI (Her Majesty’s Inspectors – i.e. Ofsted) 
to undertake monitoring visits, which was seen as more credible and therefore welcomed by the 
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schools. Yet Brent in particular was an LA that had struggled to recruit and retain high-quality 
staff, with a succession of interim appointments in key roles. This appeared to be less to do with 
its ability to pay competitive salaries so much as a sense that LAs were not seen as exciting, 
career-enhancing places to work at a time when policy attention was focused on academies. 
These staffing and leadership challenges arguably affected the LA’s ability to shape and enact a 
collectively held vision for education across the borough, particularly in the face of a number of 
high-performing and highly autonomous schools. 
The interplay between the four competing national policy narratives, the mediating layer, local 
context, and leadership agency at school level is shown diagrammatically in Figure 2. Critically, 
LAs appear to play a role in mediating the competing narratives with and on behalf of schools. 
Figure 2: The interplay between system structures, policy narratives, the mediating layer, local context, 
and leadership agency determines the level of alignment between local schools 
3. Deep partnerships, peer review, and the self-improving system
The third area illuminated by the scenarios, the policy narratives, and the case studies is school 
partnerships and support. Both LAs were brokering arrangements for strong schools to support 
struggling schools rather than drawing on in-house LA expertise where possible. What seems 
notable, though, is that neither LA had been able to fully step back in the ways envisaged in 
scenario D (LA disappears/schools collaborate). Their schools simply did not feel ready or able 
to undertake the LAs’ monitoring and intervention roles. 
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This raises a question around whether these roles could ever really move to schools in a 
‘self-improving system’. David Hargreaves (2010, 2011, 2012a, 2012b) argued that schools must 
operate in ‘deep partnerships’ for a self-improving system to be successful. However, Hargreaves 
acknowledged that building deep partnerships is difficult. In particular, he saw robust ‘evaluation 
and challenge’ between schools as particularly difficult to develop: put simply, it is hard for a 
school leader or teacher from one school to tell their counterpart in another school that their 
work is not up to scratch. But Hargreaves argued that such peer challenge is possible if sufficient 
social capital (characterized by mutual trust and reciprocity) and collective moral purpose have 
developed between the partners. 
Certainly, some of the schools in both LAs were participating in some form of peer review. 
At one end of the spectrum this was primarily about learning from practice in other schools (for 
example through Learning Walks focused on a particular aspect of practice), but at the other it 
was more akin to peer inspection and rigorous feedback on strengths and weaknesses. In general, 
though, schools in both LAs saw such work as about enhancing mutual learning and continuous 
improvement, not as a replacement for external scrutiny and challenge from the LA or Ofsted. 
In fact, they saw peer review as more difficult with schools close by in their own LA, where the 
competitive pressures were greater, than with schools further afield. Equally, many schools were 
nervous about even this level of peer review, either because they felt it would break the fragile 
trust between them or because they wanted to protect their trade secrets in a competitive 
environment. Perhaps as a result, most heads still saw themselves as fundamentally responsible 
for their own school and their own destiny. Coventry’s networks and the BSP might help in some 
respects here, but they were not yet the ‘deep partnerships’ that Hargreaves envisaged that 
could replace the traditional intervention roles of the LA.
Conclusion
This article has explored the role of LAs in the Coalition’s ‘self-improving school system’, 
drawing on illustrative case studies from two LAs, a set of future scenarios exploring how LAs 
and schools might respond in the face of academization, and a set of four policy narratives 
extrapolated from Coalition documents and speeches. In undertaking this analysis, the article has 
focused on the practicalities of the LA role, rather than debating the wider issue of democratic 
legitimacy in the oversight of schools. 
Three key findings emerge: 
• LAs have been under four pressures to change that align with the four policy narratives: 
a pressure to reduce budgets, a school empowerment pressure, a credibility pressure, 
and an accountability pressure from Ofsted. The accountability pressure appears to 
have been the most influential in changing practice. 
• The LAs have sought to increase leadership agency, in particular by providing ‘bridging 
social capital’, which strengthens school networks. While this has helped strengthen 
some school networks, their capacity and reach are limited and both localities were also 
becoming more fragmented. Progress appears to have been dependent on credibility 
and relationships between LA staff and schools, rather than statutory positions or roles. 
This need for credibility places a premium on the quality of leadership in LAs and 
schools, but, partly as a result of policy neglect, LAs have struggled to recruit and retain 
high-calibre staff, thus hampering their leadership capacity. 
• Schools in these LAs are not yet operating in the ‘deep partnerships’ envisaged by 
Hargreaves (2010), with peer review (which Hargreaves terms ‘evaluation and challenge’) 
proving the most difficult aspect to achieve. The accountability pressure on LAs to fulfil 
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their statutory obligations on school improvement may be hampering the development 
of robust peer review arrangements between schools. This raises questions about 
whether and how a fully ‘self-improving system’ can emerge or whether a new, more 
coherent but strategic mediating layer will be required under the new government. 
The analysis suggests that the scenarios and narratives resonate with current practice on the 
ground, although the scenarios underplay the continuing importance of school oversight and 
intervention by LAs. The scenarios also appear to underplay the importance of leadership agency, 
both for school and LA leaders. 
It is clear that the new Conservative Government elected in 2015 will want to increase the 
number of academies and thereby reduce the role of LAs further. Since the two studies outlined 
in this article were completed, a number of LAs across the country, including Birmingham, have 
moved further towards commissioning school partnerships to take on the lead role in monitoring 
and intervening in schools. Others, such as Lincolnshire, are requiring all their maintained schools 
to engage in peer reviews, which might help build the ‘deep partnerships’ envisaged by Hargreaves. 
It is unclear how these emerging roles will sit alongside the Regional Schools Commissioners 
created by the DfE to oversee academies. Some argue that the answer is to move all schools into 
a MAT, with the trust board responsible for monitoring and intervention, but this would require a 
massive expansion in the number and capacity of such trusts. Thus, although the picture continues 
to evolve, it seems that LAs remain a significant force within England’s complex mediating layer, 
not least because they shape the ways in which local leadership agency is framed. Whether LAs 
remain or disappear as a force within local school systems remains crucially important and 
worthy of more than mere policy neglect over the coming five years. 
Notes
1. See Child Poverty Map of the UK: Part 1: England. March 2011. End Child Poverty. Online: http://
endchildpoverty.org.uk/files/child-poverty-map-of-the-uk-part-one.pdf (accessed 3 April 2015).
2. The author is currently leading a study on the self-improving system, funded by the Nuffield Foundation 
and CfBT Education Trust.
3. A full list can be found at www.gov.uk/government/publications/directors-of-childrens-services-roles-
and-responsibilities (accessed 13 July 2015).
4. See www.nga.org.uk/Blog/December-2014/Understanding-the-new-Ofsted-framework-for-school.
aspx for a detailed overview of the LA inspection models (accessed 7 April 2015).
5. This was in my previous role as Director of Research and Development at the then National College 
for School Leadership (NCSL). The scenarios were developed with my former NCSL colleagues Dr 
Andy Coleman and Patrick Scott.
Notes on the contributor
Toby Greany is Professor of Leadership and Innovation and Director of the London Centre for Leadership 
in Learning, a centre of the UCL Institute of Education (IOE). Before joining the IOE, he was Director of 
Research and Policy at the National College for School Leadership. He has worked at the Design Council, 
the Campaign for Learning, and the Cabinet Office. From 2005–6 he was Special Advisor to the Education 
and Skills Select Committee. He has authored a number of books on schools and education, and has taught 
in Brazil, China, and the UK.
140  Toby Greany
Annex A: Four potential future scenarios for primary schools and LAs in a 
‘self-improving system’
A: Red 
(LA remains/schools 
compete)
B: Green 
(LA remains/schools 
collaborate)
C: Yellow
(LA disappears/schools 
compete)
D: Blue
(LA disappears/schools 
collaborate)
Structural solutions
Schools can buy services 
from a range of providers, 
including different LA services 
that are traded competitively 
across borders. Many schools 
become providers, but others 
struggle to know where to 
turn for support. 
Schools are encouraged 
to work together in 
families and clusters, taking 
responsibility for their 
collective improvement, 
with the LA as broker. Many 
partnerships thrive, but 
others collapse or simply 
fall into neglect. 
In a world without local 
authorities, schools become 
increasingly competitive, 
whether they have joined 
chains or multi-academy 
trusts, or remained 
independent. Local DfE 
offices sort out the problems 
of market failure.
School partnerships become 
the building blocks of a 
self-improving system, with 
headteachers as architects. In 
the absence of LAs, schools 
are directly accountable to 
the DfE. 
Responses to change 
• Core school budgets may 
have been protected, but 
most services that were 
formerly free must now 
be bought in 
• Many schools, dioceses, 
and private providers 
enter the market. Most 
LAs shrink their core 
teams to a minimum and 
focus on running viable 
traded services. Most 
work hard to maintain the 
link with primary schools, 
and some compete for 
business beyond their 
borders 
• In many areas, competition 
has the effect of improving 
the range, quality, and 
value for money of 
services to schools. 
Schools become more 
accomplished at solving 
problems in house, and 
knowing when and how to 
buy in external support
• Where the new 
arrangements work less 
well, single schools are 
left with minimal support, 
chains and federations 
become insular, and LAs 
lose their capacity and 
expertise to intervene 
with failing schools
• The DfE responds by 
requiring LAs to earn a 
‘licence to operate’ and 
making sure that chains 
are more inclusive and 
less protective of their 
brand and intellectual 
property rights.
• Most LAs turn their 
traded services into 
fully independent 
businesses. They focus 
their remaining capacity 
on brokering effective 
school partnerships. 
These partnerships are 
given responsibility for 
collective improvement, 
often based on the 
teaching school/NLE 
model 
• Where existing school 
partnerships are strong 
and there is a culture 
of peer challenge and 
support, this works well. 
In these areas the LA 
has fostered school-
to-school support for 
some time and there 
is a cadre of system 
leaders 
• In other areas the 
LA does not have the 
credibility, expertise, 
or capacity to broker 
and quality-assure 
partnerships. Schools 
object to being put into 
forced partnerships, 
but lack the leadership 
to make it work 
themselves. With no 
support or challenge 
the partnerships are 
weak, but nonetheless 
time-consuming 
• Concerned that 
schools will not be held 
rigorously to account, 
the DfE introduces new 
governance legislation, 
including paid chairs of 
governors.
• Once LAs have 
disappeared, schools find 
themselves facing some 
difficult decisions in a 
competitive market 
• The great majority 
of church schools 
join diocesan chains. 
Maintained schools have 
the option of converting 
on their own, becoming 
part of a chain, or 
joining a different kind of 
grouping
• Localism, diversity, and 
competition are the 
hallmarks of the new 
system. Many parents 
welcome the choice 
that comes with this, 
as schools compete for 
custom 
• In some areas, however, 
the big chains, often 
based on large secondary 
schools, start to 
dominate. This prompts 
the emergence of 
innovative primary chains 
and groups committed to 
maintaining the culture 
and ethos of member 
schools
• The residual powers 
of the LA transfer to 
regional commissioners 
appointed by the DfE 
to deal with market (i.e. 
school) failure and pupil 
exclusion. Over time, this 
role is expanded to cover 
aspects of pupil place 
planning and admissions. 
• Following the 
introduction of GP-led 
Clinical Commissioning 
Groups (CCGs) in 
the NHS, the DfE 
legislates to remove the 
statutory powers of 
the LA and requires all 
schools to join formal 
school commissioning 
partnerships
• As LAs disappear, heads 
and governing bodies 
take a lead in making the 
new arrangements work, 
despite the additional 
work that this requires
• The best partnerships 
design in quality 
assurance through peer 
challenge, often using 
teaching school alliances 
as the basis for a new, 
more formal approach
• The less successful 
partnerships become 
overwhelmed by the 
bureaucracy associated 
with many former LA 
functions, and some 
heads go it alone on 
the grounds that the 
partnerships they had 
joined are now too 
‘comfortable’ 
• Facing criticism that 
these alliances are just 
groups of providers 
getting together and 
that they lack rigour, 
the DfE legislates for all 
partnerships to appoint 
‘an independent partner’. 
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